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Who controls the price level?  
 






       Under the guidance of different theories and the problem of dominance and 
activeness, this study gives a survey of the rapidly growing literature on Fiscal Theory 
of Price Level, which opens up new horizons in a non –Ricardian world and questions 
the effectiveness of monetary policy on price level determination. 
  




































  1 Who controls the price level?  
 




                         
                          “Inflation is almost always a monetary phenomenon” 




       The monetarist theory gives a clear definition of the actions and limitations of the 
monetary and fiscal authorities. According to that theory, the monetary authority 
should set the money growth rate with a clear objective of price level stability and it 
should be independent of the fiscal authority to achieve its goals. Whereas the fiscal 
authority will be responsible for its own house and should aim at keeping a balanced 
budget given the price level at all time. However, Sargent and Wallace (1981) and the 
advocates of the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) indicated that this distinction 
between the monetary and fiscal authorities as two different parts of the government 
is not as strict as it seems and their relationship has important consequences on the 
price level. 
       Almost two decades ago Sargent and Wallace (1981) showed that if monetary 
policy is defined as open market operations, then even in a monetarist environment 
the fiscal authority may act in a dominant fashion and exercise significant control 
over the inflation rate. That is, it is possible for the monetary authority to be a 
‘follower’ and to lose control over the price level.      
       Advocates of the fiscal theory of the price level, such as Woodford (1995), 
Leeper (1991), Sims (1993) and Cochrane (1998) take this argument one step further 
and argue that it is actually possible for both the monetary and the fiscal authorities to 
be dominant such that, fiscal and monetary authority are not bound by the solvency of 
its budget constraint.        
       The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) arose as an attempt to explain the 
weak relation between monetary aggregates and the inflation rate in today’s 
technologically advanced environment where, it is harder to control the monetary 
aggregates.  
       The theoretical possibility of non –Ricardian policies is discussed by many 
economists and there are various studies on the relationship between the fiscal debt 
and the price level. However, there are very few empirical studies testing the FTPL. 
The studies by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1998), Tanner and Ramos (2002) and 
Cochrane (1998) have conflicting results. These studies analyses the behaviour of the 
fiscal authority through the government budget constraint. 
       This study overview the theories of price level determination and focuses on the 
theoretical and empirical studies of the fiscal theory of price level in detail. The 
following section formulates the macro model that will be used to analyse different 
theories of price level. The theoretical discussions and the empirical studies of the 
fiscal theory of price level are studied in detail in Sections Three and Four 
respectively. Section Five is the conclusion. 
 
 
  2 II. The Model: 
 
       This is a pure exchange economy with infinitely lived agents with an endowment 
of yt units of consumption good in each period. Government purchases gt, yield no 
utility to the consumers. In each period t the consumer chooses the level of 
consumption, ct, the nominal holdings of fiat currency, Mt, and the nominal holdings 
of government bonds, Bt. Fiat currency does not earn interest.  However, consumers 
earn a gross nominal rate of interest, Rt for their holdings of nominal government 
bonds. Real balances, mt are Mt / pt and the real value for government bonds, bt is Bt / 
pt. At each period t, the consumer pays txt units of consumption good in lump sum 
taxes. Consumers have separable utility functions for money and consumer goods, 
and the utility is discounted at the constant rate of (0,1).  ∈ β
       Given the initial wealth and the sequences of price, interest rate and net taxes, the 
representative consumer with a log linear utility function chooses the sequence of the 
end of period bond holdings {Bt}, the end of period money holdings, {Mt}, and the 
level of consumption {ct} to maximize his expected lifetime utility (1) with respect to 
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       and the period t+1 nominal wealth, Wt+1=Mt + Rt Bt                                                 (4) 
       The first order conditions are
3, for t = 0, 1, 2,…  
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1 Note that the utility function is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and Bt can be 
either positive (the government is borrowing from the household) or negative (the government is 
loaning to the household). 
2 In the initial period 0, the government has initial outstanding liabilities M-1 and B-1.Therefore the 
period 0 nominal wealth is: W0 = M-1 + R-1 B-1 
3 Note that under the assumption of separable utility and unitary consumption growth, ct= ct+1, equation 
















  3        Government expenditure is financed by direct lump sum taxes and by money and 
bond seignorage. Hence, the sequence of government budget constraints is defined as: 









B 1 −                   for t = 0, 1, 2,…                     (8) 
       There is no capital accumulation. In this pure exchange economy, the sequence of 
aggregate resource constraint is defined as, the total endowment in each period being 
consumed by the fiscal sector and the private agents: 
               yt = ct +gt                 for t = 0, 1, 2,…                                                                    (9)  
       In equilibrium the resource constraint (9) and the budget constraints (7) and (8) 
have to be satisfied. Note that any two of these constraints imply the third constraint. 
Therefore, it is possible to work with any two of equations (7), (8) and (9).        
        The optimisation problem includes the transversality condition.
4 The sequence of 
single period budget constraint, the sequence of aggregate resource constraint and the 
transversality condition lead to the intertemporal budget constraint
5 
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       The intertemporal budget condition (10) implies the equality between the real 
value of household sector wealth and the present value of the expected future 
government surpluses.
6 The importance of this equation for equilibrium depends on 
the fiscal/ monetary policy. 
       The equilibrium is defined as a sequence of {ct}, {Rt}, {pt}, {Mt}, {Bt}, {gt}, 
{txt} and {Wt+1} that are consistent with the monetary –fiscal policy and satisfy 
equations (5), (6), (8), (9), (10) together with the initial conditions and the exogenous 
output sequence {yt}
7. 
                                                 
4 The transversality condition requires the household to fully utilize lifetime wealth. A violation of this 
condition implies that there is still room for a household to increase its lifetime utility.  
5 The intertemporal budget constraint is obtained from the single budget constraint by summing it up 
for each time period over the infinite horizon 
6  The same equation can be derived from the government budget constraint. Following Leeper (1991) 
the relation between equations (7), (8) and (9) allows us to represent equation (10) in terms of 
government debt and surplus. Using the transversality condition –which recognizes the fact that the 
fiscal authority can sell as much bond as he wants as long as the present value of debt is equal to zero- 
and equation (8) the government intertemporal budget constraint is defined as: 
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    The real value of government debt is equal to the present discounted value of future government 
revenue –which is the tax revenues net of expenditures and seignorage - 
     Defining St as the present value of government surplus from money seignorage and tax revenue net 
of expenditures, equation (10`) can be written as:    





St                                                                                                                                      (10``) 
7 Under perfect foresight equilibrium, which we will assume for the empirical tests, the equilibrium 
sequences are such that the money and bond supplied by the government equal to the money and bond 
demanded by the household. 
  4        The fiscal –monetary policy is defined as sequences {gt}, {Rt}, {Bt}, {Mt} and 
{txt} such that the government flow budget constraint (equation (8)) is satisfied in 
every period. The policy can be Ricardian or non –Ricardian according to the relation 
between the real value of the government debt and the price level.
8 The policy is 
defined as Ricardian, if it ensures that the government budget constraint is satisfied 
for all price sequences. In case of a Ricardian policy the monetary and fiscal policy 
variables are determined endogenously by prices guaranteeing the solvency of the 
intertemporal government budget constraint. Therefore, the intertemporal budget 
constraint is satisfied for all price levels. However, for non –Ricardian policy the 
intertemporal budget constraint is an equilibrium condition, not satisfied for every 
price sequence. For non –Ricardian policies the policy authority is not constrained by 
the solvency of the intertemporal government budget constraint. Solvency will, 
however, emerge as part of the economy’s equilibrium solution.    





St, it is seen that 
a non-Ricardian fiscal policy argues that the out of equilibrium real values of the 
surplus are not equal to the real values of debt.
9 This does not mean that the 
government does not care about the budget constraint. It is simply that for non-
Ricardian polices the level of surplus is set before the price level is determined. Any 
threat to the solvency of the budget constraint is confronted by the market mechanism 
moving the price level. 
       “Under  a  non  –Ricardian  rule,  the  government  moves  before  the  “Walrasian 
auctioneer” does, so that the auctioneer is forced to call prices that are consistent with 
the real surpluses announced by the government.” (Bassetto, 2001) 
       Under a Ricardian rule, it is important to indicate whether the monetary or fiscal 
authority is dominant, in the sense that the authority sets its policy variables 
exogenously. Leeper (1991) defines a policy as active if the authority sets its policy 
variable without constraining itself by the actions of the other authority. Similarly, a 
policy is referred to as passive if the policy authority is required to set its policy 
variable in response to the actions of the other authority to satisfy the intertemporal 
budget constraints in the system.
10  
       “Because an active authority is not constrained by current budgetary conditions, it 
is free to chose a decision rule that depends on past, current, or expected future 
variables. A passive authority is constrained by consumer optimisation and the active 




       The monetarist theory of price level determination is based on the argument that 
the monetary authority has total control over prices. Under a Ricardian monetary –
fiscal policy, where the monetary authority is dominant, the fiscal authority 
determines the sequences of {gt}, {txt} and {Bt} such that the government budget 
constraint is satisfied at all price levels. Therefore, with a monetary policy controlling 
                                                 
8 Woodford (1994)   
9 A Ricardian fiscal policy argue that the fiscal policy sets the sequence of {Bt} or {txt} such that the 
real value of surplus defined as money seignorage and primary surplus is equal to B /p for all price 
levels.  
10 When a monetary/fiscal authority follows an active policy it is regarded that the monetary/fiscal 
authority is dominant. 
  5 the sequences of money supply {Mt}, the price level path is determined from the 
money market equilibrium condition, independent of the fiscal policy variables.  
       The monetarist theory on price level determination is defined by active monetary 
and passive fiscal policy operating within a Ricardian framework. Thus, following the 
basic model developed previously, under a constant level of consumption, equations 
(5) and (6) and the monetary policy setting the money supply determines the price 
level sequence independent of the fiscal policy variables: 


















                                                                                     (11)                     
       As  is  seen  from  equation  (11)  additional constraints are needed to uniquely 
determine the price level.  
 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 
       Sargent & Wallace (1981) showed that it is possible for the fiscal authority to 
affect the level of prices even with Ricardian policies. The “Unpleasant Monetarist 
Arithmetic” of Sargent and Wallace (1981) is a result of a Ricardian policy with 
active fiscal and passive monetary policies. They argue that if the fiscal authority acts 
in a dominant fashion and, for example, sets a constant level of government 
expenditures net of taxes (g –tx) and keeps the real value of government bonds (B/p) 
at a predetermined level, a Ricardian environment requires the monetary authority to 
be a follower.
11 That is, the monetary policy responds to a dominant fiscal policy by 
setting a growth rate of money to generate the money seignorage necessary to satisfy 
the government budget constraint.
12 Hence, contrary to the standard monetarist 
argument, an “…… expansionary fiscal policy is inflationary” (Sargent and Wallace, 
1981). Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) define this model of fiscal dominancy as a weak 
form of the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) due to the fact that although the 
price level is still driven by the monetary authority, the growth rate of money is now a 
function of the fiscal policy variables, g, tx and B.
13  
       In their paper, Sargent and Wallace define the monetary policy as money supply 
targeting rules. However, for our purposes it will be more convenient to define it as an 
interest rate targeting policy that is formulated to satisfy the government budget 
constraint. Hence, the interest rate rule for the monetary authority is defined by the 
government budget constraint given the household demand conditions and the fiscal 
policy.  
       Recall that for a constant level of primary surpluses, D = (g –txt) and a constant 
real government debt b, the government flow budget constraint is:
14 



















p 1 b                                                                (8`) 
       Given fiscal policy variables and the demand conditions,  (5) and (6), equation (8) 
solves for the path of the interest rate as a function of the fiscal policy variables:
15 
                                                 
11 A policy authority following an active policy is regarded as dominant and the policy authority forced 
to follow a passive policy is regarded as a follower. 
12 Sargent and Wallace define monetary policy as money growth rate policies, Mt = θMt-1.The analysis 
is based on constant government expenditures, constant rate of interest being greater than the growth 
rate of population and constant nominal bonds, which is determined historically.  
13 Dominant fiscal policies argue for central bank independence since in that model “The central bank 
is driven by the fiscal authority”  (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1999) 
14 Under the aggregate resource constraint: yt = ct + gt the household and government budget constraints 
are the same. 
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       However, stability analysis and the comparative statics show that the fiscal policy 
does not affect the (stable) steady state equilibrium interest rate.  







π  is now a function of the fiscal policy 
variables, D and b, as well as the monetary policy variable, R: 




































t π                                                         (13)                               
       “One of the most important implications of this theory is the possibility that tight 
money today could increase today’s price level! That is, a low money supply today 
necessitates increased inflation tomorrow, implying – if money demand is sufficiently 
elastic – a high price level today…….Low money today directly lowers current 
prices. But there is an additional, indirect effect – the higher future inflation necessary 
for budget balance increases the nominal interest rate, lowering real money demand 
today. The latter effect drives up today’s prices and overwhelms the former if money 
demand is sufficiently interest elastic.” (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1999)
16 
      
Fiscal Theory of Price Level  
       Ricardian  policies  do  not  permit  a  dual  dominancy  of  monetary  and  fiscal 
authorities. However, the fiscal theory of price level argues that in a non –Ricardian 
policy environment it is possible for both the fiscal and the monetary authorities to 
follow an active policy.        
       The fiscal theory of price level is a rather new approach to monetary economics 
developed by Woodford (1995), Leeper (1991) and Sims (1993) to answer the 
following questions: 
•  How is the price level determined in the case of endogenous money, which 
occurs with free banking and interest rate pegging?         
•  Is it true that monetization is not a significant financial tool for governments 
who depend less on money seignorage?  
       The weak relation between monetary aggregates and the inflation rate in the U.S. 
and the fact that the U.S. inflation rate is stable even though the U.S. follows an 
endogenous money policy are the two facts that Woodford (1995) tries to explain.
17 
The model is formed to capture the impact of fiscal policy on the price level, which is 
believed to be the missing point of the conventional monetarist view. Woodford does 
not argue that the equilibrium conditions of the quantity theory of price level are 
                                                                                                                                            
15 A detailed analysis is given in appendix A 
16 For that to hold the household money demand must be a function of future price levels as well as 
today’s level of prices.  
17 Cochrane (1998) presents the US the growth rate of base money, M1 and M2 together with the 
consumer price index. He argues, that the“… variation in inflation has essentially nothing to do with 
the history of monetary aggregates. The swings of inflation in the 1970’s and especially the dramatic 
end of inflation in the 1980’s occurred without any obvious corresponding changes in monetary 
growth.” 
  7 irrelevant, but rather incomplete.
18 Contrary to the monetarist view that inflation is 
being driven only by monetary aggregates, he argues that the price level is determined 
from the government budget constraint as the ratio of the nominal value of debt to the 
present value of expected future surpluses.  
       Woodford argues that the LM equation defines the equilibrium interest rate 
differential (in case money is exogenous) or the money supply (in case money is 
endogenous) rather than the equilibrium price level as monetarist theory suggests.
19 
Hence, with monetary policy following a pegged interest rate policy and fiscal policy 
being non-Ricardian, the price level will be determined by the present value of 
government liabilities.
20 This condition implies that “the current money supply and its 
expected future path are irrelevant for the determination of the equilibrium price 
level” Woodford (1995). A monetary shock will effect the price level eventually 
“…..only as a result of the eventual effects of monetary policy upon the size of the 
total government liabilities, which then affects the price level through the fiscal policy 
rule. And even in this case, it is arguable that such effects upon the price level as 
occur are due to fiscal effects of policy change, rather than upon the mere fact that 
households are forced to hold a different quantity of money; for the price level grows 
in proportion to the growth of total government liabilities, and not in proportion to 
growth of the monetary component of those liabilities.” (Woodford, 1995)                       
       Given the private sector’s problem, the monetary policy as an interest rate peg, 
and fiscal policy as an exogenous budget debt/surplus value, equation (5) drives the 
interest rate rule: 




p 1 1 +
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       And, the money supply is driven by equation (6`): 



















1                                                                                        (6`)          
       Hence, the intertemporal government budget constraint together with the demand 
conditions and the monetary policy solves for the price level:
21  
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       Contrary to the monetarist view that inflation is being driven only by monetary 
aggregates, in a non –Ricardian environment with active fiscal and monetary policies, 
the price level is only a function of fiscal policy variables. It is determined from the 
government budget constraint as the ratio of the nominal value of debt to the present  
 
 
                                                 
18 Under the quantity theory of money there are an infinite number of price path solving for the 
equilibrium conditions. 
19 “With an interest elastic demand and fixed supply, money demand can still determine the expected 
rate of inflation or expected price level, but it does not determine the (ex-post) price level. The 
government budget constraint then determines the price level” Cochrane (1998) 
20 Woodford, notes that the impact of fiscal policy on the equilibrium value of money is consistent with 
the findings of Sargent since the value of money, which is a part of government debt, depends upon the 
expectations of the households on the debt flow to back it. 
21 A detailed analysis is given in appendix A 




       Ricardian policies assume that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem holds. That is, 
the fiscal policy does not create any wealth effects.
25 However, this is not the case for 
non –Ricardian policies. In the case of active monetary and fiscal policies, the fiscal 
policy does create a wealth effect since an increase in the value of government bonds 
affects the households’ lifetime budget set.  
       “The way the fiscal disturbances affect the price level is through a wealth effect 
upon private consumption demand. A tax cut not balanced by any expectation of 
future tax increases would make households perceive themselves to be able to afford 
more lifetime consumption, if neither prices nor interest rates were to change from 
what would have been their equilibrium values in the absence of the tax cut. This 
would lead them to demand more goods than they choose to supply (both immediately 
and in the future). The resulting imbalance between the demand and supply of goods 
drives up the price of goods until the resulting reduction in the real value of 
households’ financial assets causes them to curtail demand (or increase supply) to the 
point at which equilibrium is restored.” (Woodford, 1998) 
       In his studies Woodford takes these strong arguments on the impact of fiscal 
policy, one step further and argues that the fiscal theory of price level works under 
any type of monetary regime unless there is a Ricardian fiscal policy, which is a 
‘special’ case.   
 
III. Theoretical Studies on Fiscal Theory of Price Level 
       One significant force behind the FTPL is the ability and will of the fiscal 
authorities to use money financing. Hence, it is reasonable to ask if governments with 
less dependence on money financing could still choose to impose a higher price level. 
The studies of Leeper (1991) and Bergin (2000) have important results on that issue. 
       Leeper (1991) argues that the average level of money seignorage is not a factor 
on deciding the financing method of the debt. Hence, it may be misleading to argue 
that economies with a low dependence of money seignorage do not choose money 
financing. He specifies cases where money financing is an option for governments 
even when all their debt is backed by taxes. In this study he solves the private sector’s 
optimisation problem given the monetary (interest rate as a function of inflation rate) 
and the fiscal (the real tax revenue as a function of the previous period government 
debt) policy functions and defines a system of inflation, π (which is a function of the 
previous period inflation rate) and real debt, b  as a function of consumption, nominal 
interest rate and nominal rate of inflation. Leeper (1991) uses this 2 equation system 
to discuss different scenarios of price level determination, one of which shows that, 
with active fiscal and passive monetary policy –i.e., under a pegged interest rate and 
constant tax revenue- the price level is determined by the government budget 
t
t
                                                 
22 The price level is determined from the intertemporal government budget constraint (equation (10)): 




























s t t m g tx r W p
23 Recall that the monetarist theory solved for a path of the price level. Additional constraints have to 
be imposed on the model for equation (13) to solve for today’s price level. However, the FTPL solves 
for today’s price level without imposing additional restrictions on the path of prices. 
24 The comparative statistics shows that a positive fiscal shock has a positive impact on the price level 
25 “Government bonds are not net wealth” (Barro, 1984). 
  9 constraint.
26  “Under pegged nominal interest rates and active fiscal behaviour, 
monetary policy’s effect on prices depends on how the fiscal authority adjusts direct 
taxes in response to real debt movements. When taxes are unresponsive to debt, 
unanticipated monetary contractions immediately raise nominal interest rates and real 
debt and lower real balances. Prices respond with a lag. If future direct taxes rise (fall) 
with increases in real debt, the contraction lowers (raises) current inflation.” (Leeper, 
1991) 
       Bergin (2000) follows the same approach to address the importance of money 
financing in the case of a monetary union. He formulates a two-country model with a 
common central bank. In this model, the central bank controls the money supply 
through open market operations. The national governments receive transfers from the 
central bank and adjust lump-sum taxes to finance their deficits.
27 The rational 
expectations equilibrium conditions of the model lead to important arguments for a 
monetary union. First of all, under certain risk sharing assumptions, it is not required 
for all the member countries to have fiscal solvency for price stability. It is argued that 
under perfect insurance the debt of a country is absorbed by the surplus of another 
country. It is important to point out the fact that this proposition leads to important 
wealth effects. Bergin (2000) also argues that one bad apple could spoil the whole 
bundle. Even if the common central bank refuses to issue new money, the 
governments with large debt would still follow irresponsible polices and campaign for 
higher price levels. This is a problem for other countries too since an increase in the 
unbacked debt of a government not only increases the price level in that country but it 
increases price levels all through the monetary union. 
       In contrast to these arguments, the study by Dupor (2000) on open market models 
indicates that the FTPL is not sufficient to pin down the equilibrium price level. He 
studies the determination of the exchange rate in a two-country set up with dominant 
fiscal policy and nominal interest rate pegging. His model allows for households to 
exchange goods, money and government bonds under a no –arbitrage condition in the 
bonds market. His solutions for the cases of substitutable and non-substitutable 
currencies indicate that, “ the nominal exchange rate is indeterminate if both 
governments peg the interest rate on domestic bonds.” (Dupor, 2000) This conclusion 
for the indeterminacy of the price levels of each country and the exchange rate is in 
contrast to the arguments of the FTPL. 
       To see if the FTPL is an acceptable model, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) analyses 
the reliability of the assumptions of two different versions of the FTPL, which they 
name ‘strong form’ and ‘weak form’ FTPL.  Both forms of the FTPL assume a 
dominant fiscal policy for price level determination. However, they differ in the way 
the monetary policy is applied. “Weak form FT posits that inflation is indeed a 
monetary phenomenon, but that money growth is dictated by the fiscal authority. 
Strong form FT, on the other hand, argues that even if money growth is unchanged, 
fiscal policy independently affects the price level and the inflation rate” (Carlstrom 
and Fuerst, 1999). Working with separable preferences and an interest rate pegging 
policy, the partial and general equilibrium analyses of the weak and strong form FT 
indicate that, strong form FT requires unrealistically large interest elasticity of money 
                                                 
26 “..an active authority is not constrained by current budgetary conditions, it is free to choose a 
decision rule that depends on past, current or expected future variables. A passive authority is 
constrained by consumer optimisation and active authority ‘s actions, so it must generate sufficient tax 
revenues to balance the budget” Leeper (1991) 
27 It is assumed that the transfers to the national governments are symmetric 
 
  10 demand and output elasticity of money demand for fiscal policy to be able to 
determine the price path.  
       The dependability of the FTPL for real world analyses is also questioned in the 
study of Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999). They argue that that it is more reasonable to 
believe in the monetarist theory of price determination since it is not ‘logical’ for 
governments to choose an inflationary outcome.
28    
       McCallum (2001) is against FTPL due to the definition of the fiscal policy that is 
used.
29 He argues that the fiscal policy variable is actually the bond supply to the 
public, not the primary deficit or surplus. He shows that there is a monetarist type 
solution for the price level in an FTPL framework, where the bond supply is taken as 
the fiscal policy variable.  
       Cushing (1999) is another attack on the FTPL. He modifies the original model 
used by the advocates of FTPL and assumes that the households face a certain 
probability of death.
30 Households do not leave bequests but they receive payments 
from insurance companies. The insurance companies finance these premium 
payments by collecting the financial assets of the deceased. The equilibrium 
conditions of this model create a system of money supply, bond supply and the price 
level, which is a function of the interest rate, government spending, probability of 
death, money supply and bond supply. Cushing solved the model for the cases of 
Ricardian and non –Ricardian consumers and concluded that the price level is 
indeterminate.
31  
        In their study on the FTPL, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) are rather careful on 
the conditions where this theory might work. They model a cash-in-advance 
economy, to study the dependability of the balanced budget requirement as an anchor 
for price stability. Under the assumption that the government is not allowed to finance 
the deficit with money seignorage, the price level is determinate in case the primary 
rather than the secondary budget surplus/deficit is taken to be exogenous.    
       To conclude, the FTPL is a controversial theory. 
 
IV. Empirical Studies on Fiscal Theory of Price Level  
       These theoretical models of the price level determination were tested by many 
empirical studies. Some of these studies followed a time series and others followed a 
structural approach. 
       Structural studies use the government budget constraint to model the inflation rate 
as a function of government debt. Metin (1998), Ruge-Marcia (1999) and Cardosa 
(1992) are some recent examples of this type of empirical study.   
       Metin (1998) estimated the following equation for the inflation rate in Turkey as 
a function of the Turkish budget deficit and output growth:
32 
33      
                                                 
28 Their arguments on FTPL are based on certain examples for monetary and fiscal policy.  
29 His results are independent of the elasticity of money demand and any specific form of price path 
that has been required in previous studies. 
30 The probability of death is used to differentiate between Ricardian and non-Ricardian policies as 
well as to create a divergence between the asset holdings of agents. For the Ricardian consumer the 
probability of death is zero 
31 He argues that the FTPL is based on the two unrealistic assumptions; i) the government debt 
converges and ii) the future inflation is constant. 
32 The price level equation is a result of the modification of the government budget constraint; 
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  11        ∆p= a+ δB - ∆y 




G is public sector expenditures, T is revenues, and H is base money.  
       The  regression  results  and  tests  for  cointegration  indicated  that  government 
deficits have a significant positive impact on the inflation rate.
34   
        Ruge-Murcia (1999) used annual data for Brazil over the sample period 1940 –
1988, finding that the level of expenditure is an important factor for the level and 
volatility of the inflation rate.
35 
36  
         Although these studies are for countries with huge government debt, there are 
studies for the U.S. indicating that non monetary factors have a significant impact on 
the price level.            
       Ahking and Miller (1985) used a multi- equation time series approach to study 
the relation between inflation and the public debt. In this study, they followed a three-
stage procedure where base money growth, government deficits and inflation were 
treated as endogenous variables. The three–stage OLS analyses for the U.S. economy 
showed that government deficits have an important effect on the inflation rate.
37 
38  
       Dhakal, Kandil, Sharma and Trescott (1984) focused on demand-pull/ cost-push 
theories for the causes of inflation.
39 First, they estimated a vector autoregression 
(VAR) model of the money stock M1, producer price index, interest rate and the gross 
national product to test the validity of the monetarist approach to explaining the 
inflation rate. Second, they created three new models by adding the government debt, 
wage rate and energy prices sequentially to the original model to search for the non-
                                                                                                                                            
where, ∆ is the difference operator,G is public sector expenditures, T is revenues, H is base money, P is 
prices and Y is real income.  
       In steady state, 
                                                                                                          (M2)                              ) (
* * y p H
PY
H
H ∆ + ∆ −
∆
= ∆
where, p and y are log(P) and log(Y) respectively. 
       Solving equation (M2) for   and using it in equation (M1) gives the budget constraint; 
PY
H ∆
                                                                                                      (M3)                     ) (
* * y p H H
PY
T G
∆ + ∆ + ∆ =
−
       Then, equation (M3) is solved for price level. 
33 Annual data over the sample period 1950-1987.  
34 “…..an increase in the scaled budget deficit immediately increases inflation.” Metin (1998)   
35 In that study Ruge- Marcia developed a dynamic model for inflation in case of monetization of the 
government debt, which is defined as the difference between government expenditures and the tax 
revenue. Tax revenue is modelled as a backward looking process such that it is influenced by the past 
inflation rates. He assumed a Cagan model for money demand and that the money supply is an 
endogenous process indexed to the government debt. The government debt is endogenous and assumed 
to be partially financed by an increase in money supply. The government expenditure is regarded as the 
fiscal policy variable and is assumed to follow a stationary second order autoregression process. 
Following a rational expectations approach the model is solved for the inflation rate, which is a 
function of past inflation rates and the discounted values of current and expected future government 
expenditures.  
36 It is assumed that the money supply and budget deficit are endogenous but government expenditure 
is an exogenous variable. 
37 Annual data over the sample period of 1950-1980 
38 “…the deficits cause inflation in the 1950’s and the 1970’s but not in the 1960’s. The quantitative 
effect of deficits on inflation is small in the 1970’s but not in the 1950’s” (Ahking and Miller, 1985) 
39 Quarterly data over the period of 1957-1991 
  12 monetarist determinants of inflation.
40 For each of these four models they used the 
results of Granger causality tests and the specific gravity criterion of Caines, Keng 
and Sethi (1987) to solve the identification problem. However, the results could not 
resolve the conflict between the monetarist view and recent developments on inflation 
rate determination. The monetarist model indicates that the money supply has a strong 
effect on the price level. However, the VAR results also indicate that government 
debt, the wage rate and energy prices Granger cause the inflation rate. The VAR 
analysis indicates that the public debt has a significant effect on the inflation rate 
through aggregate demand, even when monetization was not an issue. 
       The study by Cardoso (1992) on the economies of Brazil and Mexico indicates 
that fiscal policy is important for the stability of inflation in open economies. The 
empirical analysis of an open economy model showed that fiscal consolidation is very 
important for the success of disinflationary programs for economies with large fiscal 
debt.
41 Moreover, it indicated that the existence of a huge external debt is a leading 
factor of the inflationary impact of government debt.  
        The importance of the definition of the government debt for the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy is the central point in the study of Abizadeh and Yousefi (1998). They 
argued that the inconclusive results of empirical studies on the impact of the budget 
deficit on the inflation rate is due to the limited definition of public debt for closed 
economy models.
42 They analysed an open economy IS –LM model by VAR. The 
need to solve for multicollinearity between monetary and non monetary variables of 
inflation, led to a linear model of the domestic inflation rate (Pt) as a function of 
lagged real gross domestic product (Yt-1), the real deficit (DFt), the foreign rate of 
inflation (qt) and the domestic money supply (M1t):
43 
        Pt = f [Yt-1, DFt, qt, M1t ]  
The OLS and ML estimation results showed that  “…budget deficits have no 
significant bearing on the rate of inflation”.
44 
              Cochrane (1998b) criticizes this monetarist view and argues that the fiscal 
authority has a clear objective to minimize the volatility of inflation rate. 
       He argues that the composition of the government debt is crucial for the effect of 
surpluses on the price level and extends the one period debt version of the fiscal 
theory of price level to include long –term debt. Hence, the government debt is a 
function of nominal bond prices and so it is also a function of expected future price 
levels. His analysis shows that the fiscal authority is able to postpone inflation by 
choosing an appropriate debt structure. A fiscal authority following an optimal 
passive policy can smooth inflation with a long maturity debt structure rather than 
with a short maturity structure if the present value of the surplus is more volatile than 
                                                 
40 An increase in energy prices and wage rate are the cost-push factors of inflation. Such a policy 
increases the cost of production, leading to a lower level of output. The consequent decline in output 
will result with an increase in the price level. However, any change in the budget deficit is a demand-
pull factor of inflation. An increase in budget deficit implies higher government spending and lower 
taxes creating a positive impact on demand. 
41The definitions for inflation rate, interest rate, balance of payments and the domestic credit creation 
together with the assumption that the public debt is financed by domestic credit (without bond 
financing) and external borrowing (no private external borrowing), the inflation rate is defined as a 
function of money supply, the share of the primary budget deficit in output and the share of net exports 
in output.       
42In open economy models, the government spending is financed by the tax revenue, the money and 
bond seignorage and the net transfer payments to other governments.   
43The principal components method used to solve the problem of multicollinearity  
44 Annual data for U.S. over the sample period 1951-1986 
  13 the level of surplus.
45 Similarly, the fiscal authority following an optimal active policy 
will have the ability to exchange future inflation with a decrease in today’s price level 
by devaluing long-term bonds unexpectedly.
46   
       Cochrane (1998b) argues that the fiscal authority follows an optimal policy to 
smooth the inflation rate. The fiscal authority has control over the maturity structure 
and the level of debt and has partial control over the surplus. The surplus structure, st 
is a function of the cyclical portion –which the fiscal authority cannot control, and the 
controllable component. Given the equation for the price level,
47 the optimal fiscal 
policy is the one where the government chooses the maturity structure and the level of 
nominal debt sequence to minimize the inflation rate.   
       A comparison of the artificial time series generated by this optimal fiscal policy 
with the actual U.S. data shows some similarities. However, it is not a perfect match. 
Cochrane (1998b) argues that the reason is that the optimal fiscal model is too 
successful in reducing the variation of the inflation rate. 
       Cochrane (1998a) studies the history of the U.S. inflation rate from an FTPL 
view, using a structural VAR model of prices, debt and the surplus, which is modelled 
as a sum of a controllable (long run) component and a cyclical component. 
       The results of this analysis for the inflation rate are the same as those in the 
previous paper by Cochrane. The model fits nicely to the US data. Based on this 
finding Cochrane argues that, the government adjusts its budget to smooth the rate of 
inflation in case of a cyclical surplus shock. The government “…sells extra debt in 
recessions, raising revenue by so doing because it implicitly promises to raise 
subsequent surpluses” (Cochrane, 1998)     
        At another extreme, the study by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1998) supports 
the monetarist view of the US inflation rate. They focus on the two opposite 
approaches to price level determination, –money or fiscal dominant regimes.
48 The 
basic assumptions of these regimes are important for the effect of monetary / fiscal 
policies on the price level.
49 Hence, in order to choose the monetary policy for price 
stability it is necessary to decide on the right nominal anchor for the economy: fiscal 
dominance (FD) or monetary dominance (MD). VAR methods are used to distinguish 
between MD and FD regimes, and to see which regime the country has been 
following. They argue that the basic difference between the monetarist view and the 
FTPL lies in the way they look at the government budget constraint. In their closed 
                                                 
45Cochrane describes the optimal passive policy as the one in which “…the government determines 
only the steady state level of debt and its maturity structure, and the government does not adjust debt in 
response to surplus shocks”    
46Cochrane describes the optimal active policy as the one in which the government “….changes the 
amount and maturity structure in response to surplus shocks”  
47 Cochrane argues that the sequence of prices are a solution to the present value identity (except the 
case of no new debt) for a given sequences of debt and surplus. The present value identity is the 
equality of the real value of outstanding debt to the present value of net surpluses;  







Iterating this identity forward with geometric weights together with the equation of surplus leads to the 
price equation (*) 
48 Fiscal dominant regime is defined as the one in which the price level is determined independently of 
the monetary aggregates, by the solvency of the government budget constraint. In contrast, in the 
money dominant regime the price level is determined by the supply and demand of money. 
49 Applying a money supply rule would cause an over determined price level in case of FD regime. 
However, an interest rate targeting rule results with an undetermined price level in case of an MD 
regime 
  14 economy model, the primary deficit is financed by bond or money seignorage. After 
scaling the variables of the customary government budget constraint by GDP, the 
model can be represented as: 
          wj =sj +αj wj+1                                                                           
where, the ratio of liabilities to GDP, wj, is equal to ratio of the surplus to the GDP, sj, 
plus the discounted value, αj, of the ratio of next period’s liabilities. Under MD and 
FD there is a positive correlation between sj and wj. However, the relation between sj 
and wj+1 distinguishes between FD and MD. Under the assumption that the debt is 
following a backward looking process, monetarist theory predicts a fall in wj+1 in case 
of an increase in surplus. In contrast, in the fiscal regime a positive innovation in sj 
can have a zero, positive or negative effect on wj+1, depending upon whether sj has a 
zero positive or negative correlation with future surpluses and discount factors. For 
the empirical tests, the authors look at the impulse responses and the forecast 
variances for the effect of the ratio of current surplus/GDP on the ratio of next period 
liabilities/GDP. The results indicate that the surplus is not exogenous but is affected 
by the current level of liabilities and although the current surplus/GDP ratio is not 
negatively correlated with future surpluses, the liabilities/GDP has negative reaction 
to a positive shock in surplus/GDP
50. Hence, it is concluded that, “the post war US 
data strongly favours the MD regime over the FD regime”.
51 
       Erdogdu (2001) also supports the money dominant regime for U.S. However, 
using the same approach as Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1998), Tanner and Ramos 
(2002) conclude that Brazil follows a fiscal dominant regime.  
       Tanner and Ramos (2002) first define the government budget constraint as 
primary budget deficit (PDEF) being a function of real liabilities (LIAB): 
. 1 − + = t t LIAB PDEF β κ
52 The problem with this backward looking approach (today’s 
primary deficit is a function of yesterday’s liabilities) is that in some cases, it cannot 
distinguish between a monetary dominant (ex –post adjustments of primary deficits to 
liabilities) and a fiscal dominant (ex –ante adjustments of liabilities to primary 
deficits) regime. Therefore, besides this one equation approach, they adopt a forward 
–looking approach and estimate a VAR system composed of two variables, primary 
deficits (first differences) and real liabilities (first differences). This model is again 
based on the definition of the intertemporal government budget constraint, that is 
“today’s operational deficit is equal to the sum of discounted changes in the primary 
deficit” (Tanner and Ramos, 2002).  
       The estimates of Tanner and Ramos (2002) for these models using monthly data 
for the period 1991 –2000 concluded that Brazil follow a monetary dominant regime 
only for the period 1995 –1997 and this period became a fiscal dominant regime 
afterwards.        
 
V. Conclusion:        
       In order to solve a problem, the first step is to determine the factors that caused it. 
Since, inflation is one thing the economists agree on that it has to be under control, the 
                                                 
50Cochrane (1998b) criticises this argument and argues that the negative effect of higher surpluses on 
the real debt is not a monetary outcome but the result of a conscious decision by the fiscal policy. 
51 The VAR result indicated that the surplus is not exogenous but affected by the current level of the 
liabilities and although the current surplus/GDP ratio is not negatively correlated with future surpluses, 
the liabilities/GDP has negative reaction to a positive shock in surplus/GDP. 
52 Tanner and Ramos (2002) discusses different scenarios for different values of κ   β ,
  15 recent literature asks the question “who is responsible for inflation rate” one more 
time.  
       In theoretical level understanding the fiscal theory of price level is crucial for 
countries with high, chronic inflation rate, since the theory questions the power of the 
monetary authority and moreover, arises the question “is an independent central bank 
enough for price stability?”
53. Therefore, it is not just an academic curiosity to search 
for non –Ricardian environments, but it is practically important for countries with 









































                                                 
53 Ercan Uygur (2001) asks this question for Turkey. 
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  18 APPENDIX. Price Level Determination 
 
        Appendix solves the model given in Part Two for the cases of  
1.  Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic: Ricardian policy; active fiscal and passive 
            monetary policy 
2.  Fiscal Theory of Price Level: Non Ricardian policy; active fiscal and active  
            monetary policy  
and analyses the long run effect of a fiscal shock on price level in each of these cases.  
       In case of an active fiscal policy the fiscal authority will set his policy variables 
{gt}, {txt} and {bt} independent of the solvency of the government budget constraint. 
I will assume that they are set as constants. Assuming a constant output level, it 
follows that the consumption level must also be constant. So, the first order 
conditions of the household optimisation problem imply:  








β                                                                                                     (5’) 












c m                                                                                                   (6) 
where c is the constant consumption level. 
       Note that under the aggregate resource constraint, equation (9), the household and 
government budget constraints are represented by the same equation: 
       pt(gt –txt) = Mt –Mt-1 +Bt –(Rt-1) Bt-1        
 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic:  
              Under a Ricardian environment, an active fiscal policy leaves the monetary 
authority with the burden of the solvency of the government budget constraint. Hence, 
the monetary policy is driven by the fiscal policy variables.  
       For a constant level of primary surpluses, D = (g –txt) and constant real valued 
government debt, b, the government’s flow budget constraint is
54: 



















p 1 b                                                                (8’) 
       Given fiscal policy and the demand conditions –equation (5) and (6), equation 
(8’) becomes a function of R, D and b. 
























































                                     (8’’)                               
       Equation (8’’) is solved for the path of the monetary policy variable, the interest 
rate, as a function of D and b: 

































t 1                                                             (12)                               







π follows from  (5) and (15): 
                                                 
54 Under the aggregate resource constraint: yt = ct + gt the household and government budget constraints 
are same. 




































t π                                                         (13)                               
       Suppose, 
c
c b D − − −
=
) 1 ( α
φ  and 
β
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       The steady state interest rates must, from (12), solve: 
                ) 1 ( ) 1 )( ( − = − + − R R R α φ φ
       There are two steady state values of interest rate: 
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       To check for the stability of the steady state,  2
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       Hence,   is a stable and   is an unstable equilibrium.  1 1 = R 2 R
 
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level 
       As opposed to unpleasant monetarist argument the fiscal theory of the price level 
argues that the price level is determined by the fiscal policy, even if the monetary 
authority follows an active policy. 
       In a non –Ricardian environment, an active fiscal policy requires that the 
households will hold government bonds. However, if households know that the 
government will roll over its debt without ever retiring it, they will not demand any 
bonds. The condition to prevent zero demand is for the households to know that the 
government will finance its future debt with future surplus.  Therefore, in order to 
prevent ponzi games the transversality condition has to hold. Therefore, the FTPL 
works with the intertemporal government budget constraint.                                                                    
       The central bank sets the rate of interest such that: 




p 1 1 +
β
                                                                                                 (5’) 
       The money supply is: 



















1                                                                                        (6’)          
       Recall that the government budget constraint together with the transversality 
condition derives the intertemporal budget constraint:  
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. Thus, equation (14) is:    Ψ + Γ = Ω
       Given the fiscal policy Dt = Dt+1 = D and equations (5’) and (6’); 
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and the rate of inflation is: 
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